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FUTURES TRADING IN CHEESE: HOW WILL IT WORK?
Robert A. Cropp and Edward V. Jesse
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The Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange, Inc. (CSCE) has formally requested approval
from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to trade futures contracts and
futures options for cheddar cheese and nonfat dry milk. Approval by the CFTC is anticipat-
ed, with actual trading commencing early summer 1993.
Organized futures markets have been in existence for nearly 130 years, beginning with
grain futures contracts in 1865. However, futures trading is a new concept for dairy.
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Consequently, many questions are being raised with respect to how futures and options may
be used and their potential benefits to and other impacts on dairy manufacturers, dairy food
ingredient users and dairy farmers.
In this paper, we address some basic questions concerning futures markets and the
mechanics of futures trading. We then provide several illustrations showing how manufac-
turing milk plants, buyers of dairy products, and dairy farmers might use futures trading to
hedge price risk. Finally, we reflect on how futures might benefit the dairy industry. Two
appendices provide additional hedging examples and illustrate the calculation of basis for
some representative hedges. The paper centers on cheese futures, but trading nonfat dry milk
futures would be similar. The use of options will be discussed in another paper.
1 The authors are Professors in the Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Wiscon-
sin-Madison and dairy marketing specialists with Cooperative Extension, University of Wisconsin-
Extension.
2 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange traded butter futures contracts for a short period during the
mid-1950’s to early 1960’s. Trading in this contract was very limited because butter prices were being
supported by the federal dairy price support program during most of this period.What is a futures market?
A futures market can be contrasted with a cash or spot market. A cash or spot market
provides for immediate delivery of and payment for the commodity traded. The purpose is to
fulfill the immediate needs of buyers and sellers. Cheese plants typically sell their cheese to
cheese buyers through private negotiations. This kind of transaction is an informal cash
market. The National Cheese Exchange at Green Bay, Wisconsin is an organized wholesale
cash market for block and barrel cheddar cheese.
A futures market is a place where futures contracts are traded. A futures contract
involves a commitment to either accept or make delivery of a specified quantity and quality of
a commodity at a specified time, and often at a specified place of delivery. No actual
commodity changes hands unless and until the contract comes due or matures.
How and why did futures markets develop?
The origin and development of futures markets dates to the mid-19th century with the
expansion of market areas, particularly for grain. There was increased market price risk due
to the long time period between grain production, storage and final sale. There was a need to
protect against a loss in grain inventory value due to price declines between harvest and sale.
Initial attempts to avoid this price risk involved establishing a price for grain before it had
arrived at its destination through what were termed, "to arrive" contracts. This procedure
passed price risk onto the buyer, but many grain dealers and processors were unwilling to
absorb all the price risk. The development of futures markets alleviated the problem of
sharing the risk of unfavorable price movements and thereby increased the flow of risk capital
into the market place.
The first organized futures market was the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) The
CBOT was founded in 1848 as a cash grain market, but it did not start futures trading in
grain until 1865. Today, there are twelve futures markets in the United States. These futures
markets are operated by one of twelve futures organizations, called futures exchanges.
Futures markets also exist in Canada, Argentina, Japan, India, Australia and several European
countries.
More than one hundred different commodities are traded on U.S. futures markets.
Early in their history, futures markets traded only agricultural commodities. Raw farm
commodities like corn, wheat, soybeans, cotton, cattle, hogs, sugar, cocoa, and coffee still
make up a large portion of futures market trading. But non-farm commodities such as gold,
silver, heating oil and plywood are also actively traded, and recently, financial instruments
like Treasury Bills, interest rates, and foreign currencies, have come to make up a majority
share of futures trading.
2A major reason for the existence of futures markets is to provide a means for shifting
the risk of price change on the cash market for the commodities involved. This is ac-
complished through a process called hedging which is explained later. For hedgers, futures
markets are not places to buy and sell commodities; they are used to protect price and profit
objectives in the cash market.
What is the Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange, Inc.?
The Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange, Inc., located in New York City, is one of the
twelve U.S. futures exchanges. Originally known as the Coffee Exchange of the City of New
York, it was founded in 1882 by a group of coffee merchants who wished to avoid the risk of
a cash market collapse by organizing a market for trading in coffee futures. In 1914, the
exchange expanded to include futures in sugar, and, in 1916, it became the New York Coffee
and Sugar Exchange. On September 28, 1979, the New York Cocoa Exchange, which had
been in existence since 1925, merged with the Coffee and Sugar Exchange, and the name
Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange, Inc. was adopted.
The Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange, Inc., as well as the other eleven futures
exchanges are not-for-profit membership associations, incorporated in the states in which they
are located. Membership in each exchange is limited to a specific number of specific
individuals. Every membership is owned by an individual; however, companies, corporations,
partnerships, and cooperatives may be registered for certain membership privileges.
What are the commitments of buyers and sellers of futures contracts?
If the initial trade on the futures market is the purchase of a contract, the buyer is said
to be long in the market. The buyer has purchased a commitment to receive delivery of a
commodity at a specific future date and at a specific price. If the initial trade is the sale of a
contract, the seller is said to be short in the market. The seller has sold a commitment to
make delivery of a commodity at a specific date and at a specific price.
In most all instances the buyers and sellers of the contracts will not hold the contracts
until they mature. Instead they will cover themselves by offsetting a position previously
taken on the futures market with an opposite transaction of the contract before maturity.
Thus a seller of a futures contract (short) covers him/herself by purchasing a futures contract
prior to maturity of the contract. A purchaser of a futures contract (long) would cover
through the sale of a futures contract.
Normally, few futures contracts are settled by actual delivery of a commodity, but
instead are covered. This is because the individuals are either using the futures contracts to
protect their profit objective on the cash market (hedging) or attempting to make a profit on
futures contract price changes (speculating).
3Futures contract commitments are legally enforced by requiring actual delivery and
acceptance of delivery of the underlying physical commodity if a contract is allowed to
mature. When contracts are covered, there is no delivery or acceptance of a commodity, but
there is a cash settlement. For example, if the initial transaction is the sale of a cheese
futures contract for $1.30 per pound and the contract is later covered by the purchase of a
cheese futures contract for $1.25 per pound, a profit of $.05 per pound will be received from
the futures market. On the other hand if this same contract had been covered by the purchase
of a cheese futures contract for $1.35 per pound, there would be a loss of $.05 per pound,
which would require a payment to the futures market.
Who are the key players in a futures market?
Hedgers, speculators and brokers comprise the key players in the futures market. A
hedger uses the futures market to protect a cash market price and profit objective by shifting
the risk of price change. The hedger deals in both the cash and futures market--expecting
that any loss in one market will be offset by a gain in the other market. These transactions
are known as hedging. Hedging involves making simultaneous and opposite transactions in
the cash and futures markets.
Speculators assume the price risk that hedgers try to avoid. The motive of speculators
is to make a profit in the futures market by buying and selling futures contracts. While profit
is the motive, speculators provide the futures market with an essential element, liquidity,
which enables hedgers to buy or sell contracts when they want to set or lift their hedges.
Although speculators usually have no commercial interest in commodities, the potential for
profit motivates them to gather market information regarding supply and demand and to
anticipate its effect on prices. By buying and selling futures contracts, speculators also help
provide information about the impact of current events on expected prices. In essence,
speculators make the market more fluid, bridging the gap between the prices bid and offered
by other commodity traders.
In order to trade on the futures market, orders must go through a broker. A broker is
an agent for the customer (hedger, or speculator) who executes a futures contract order. The
broker charges a commission for executing the trade. Commissions are "round-trip", entitling
the trader to buy and sell their contract.
What is the procedure for trading futures contracts?
In order to trade on the futures market an individual or firm will need to contact a
broker to open an account and sign a customer agreement. The customer agreement will
specify whether the interest is in speculating or hedging. The broker will carry out the trades
for the customer by contacting a Futures Commission Merchant (FCM). The broker contacted
may actually be an employee with a FCM. The FCM is a firm that transacts trades on the
4futures exchange on behalf of financial and commercial institutions as well as the general
public. FCM become registered member firms of futures exchange in order to trade or handle
accounts. The basic function of the FCM is to represent the interest of those in the market
who do not hold a membership (seat) on the futures exchange.
A floor broker is a broker on the exchange trading floor who does the actual trading.
The FCM places the customer’s order with the floor broker. Floor brokers may also take
outside orders from commercial interests, processors, exporters and even speculators. Floor
brokers should be distinguished from locals. Locals are also on the exchange floor but trade
for their own account and speculate on futures price movements.
Futures exchange participants, both buyers and sellers, are required to post perfor-
mance bond margins. Performance bond margins are financial guarantees to ensure that
buyers and sellers will fulfill their obligations of the futures contract rather than walk away.
Performance bond margin provides for contract integrity. Margin requirements for futures
contracts usually range between 5 and 15 percent of a contract’s face value and are set by the
futures exchange where contracts are traded. The size of the margin depends upon the
probability of a price change. A higher margin is required in a volatile (or risky) market than
in a less volatile market.
Brokerage firms may require a larger margin than the futures market minimum but
they cannot require less. Margin levels also vary for hedging and speculating accounts.
Generally lower margins are required for hedging accounts because they carry less risk than
speculating accounts. Margin may be in the form of cash or government securities.
3
The performance bond margin posted by traders at the time they place an order to buy
or sell a futures contract is called initial margin. The initial margin is intended to offset any
loses that might be incurred if the contract were liquidated. If prices move in favor of the
trader (e.g., rising price for a long position or falling price for a short position), then no
additional margin is required. But if prices move unfavorably, and erode the initial margin
less the loss that would occur if the contact were liquidated below a specified level, then the
trader will be obligated to post additional margin. The request for additional margin is
referred to as a margin call.
Margin calls provide some assurance against trader defaults. For example, if the price
of a commodity increases, a seller of a futures contract could possibly gain by defaulting on
the contract and forfeiting the initial margin. Sufficient additional margin will be required to
3 The advantage of using government securities as margin is that they earn interest for the
customer at the same time that they serve as a performance bond for the futures market position.
Brokers seldom pay interest on cash margins. The disadvantage of using government securities as
margin is that the denominations are large and "lumpy," meaning that the performance bond may be
much larger than required. Different rules pertaining to margin calls and profit payouts apply to
margin deposits in cash and securities.
5more than offset the seller’s gain from defaulting. Should a customer refuse to come up with
additional margin, his/her position will be closed out by the broker and the resulting loss will
be deducted from the margin. If the remaining margin is not sufficient to cover the loss, the
customer may be sued or subject to other penalties.
Just as every buyer or seller of a futures contract must maintain adequate funds in
his/her margin account with the brokerage firm, so must each brokerage firm maintain
adequate funds in its margin account with the futures exchange clearing house to cover the
positions of its customers.
Margins are returned to the seller and buyer when the contract is offset (covered) by
an opposite transaction or when the contract matures. When futures price movements favor
the trader, the margin plus futures gain (profit) are returned. If a trader experiences a loss on
the futures contract trade, then the loss is deducted from the margin.
Who accounts for futures contract transactions and margin requirements?
Essential to each futures exchange is a clearinghouse. Clearinghouses are responsible
for day-to-day settlements of thousands of accounts and transactions, collecting and main-
taining margin monies, regulating delivery, and reporting trading data. Their operations
insure the financial integrity of the marketplace.
Both buyers and sellers of futures contracts are responsible to the clearinghouse
through FCMs or brokerage firms who are members of the clearinghouse. Clearinghouses act
as third parties to all futures contracts -- acting as a buyer to every clearing member seller
and a seller to every clearing member buyer. Buyers and sellers of futures contracts do not
create financial obligations to one another, but, rather, to the clearinghouse through their
clearing member firms. As a third party to every trade, the clearinghouse assumes the
responsibility of guarantor of every trade.
Clearing houses settle all accounts to a net gain or loss each trading day, and balance
their own books to a net zero position, since gains must fully offset losses. Gains are
credited to accounts of member firms or, in some cases, paid out to customers. Losses that
erode margin deposits below required levels require prompt posting of additional funds.
How are futures markets regulated?
U.S. futures exchanges are required by state and federal laws to regulate the conduct
of members, member firms, and their employees. The rules and regulations of futures
exchanges are extensive and are designed to support competitive, efficient, liquid markets.
Exchange rules and regulations cover many areas of futures trading -- from contract specifica-
tion to trading practices to arbitration procedures. For example, the exchange sets daily
6trading limits on the maximum price range allowed each trading day for a contract. Position
limits are set on the maximum number of futures contracts that may be held by a market
participant. FCMs are liable for losses that occur due to error or mishandling a customer’s
order. Members who default on futures contracts may be suspended until the contract is
performed or the debt is satisfied.
The obligation of the exchanges to enforce their own rules and regulations were
enhanced in the 1900’s with passage of several federal acts. Of most relevance today is the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, and the Futures Trading Acts of 1978,
1982, 1986, and 1990. Prior to the 1974 act, federal regulation of exchanges was through the
Commodity Exchange Authority which was housed in the U.S. Department of Agriculture and
reported to the Secretary of Agriculture. The 1974 act created an independent federal
regulatory agency, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The subsequent
Futures Trading Acts re-authorized the continuation of the CFTC and clarified its jurisdiction.
The CFTC has five full-time commissioners appointed by the President with Senate
confirmation. The CFTC’s regulatory powers extend to exchange actions and to the review
and approval of futures contracts proposed by an exchange. The CFTC has regulatory powers
over floor brokers, FCMs, and other market participants. Exchanges and their clearinghouses
are required by the CFTC to maintain daily trading records. The CFTC is authorized to take
emergency steps in the markets under certain conditions, such as actual or threatened market
manipulation, or some other event that prevents the market from reflecting true sup-
ply/demand factors.
In addition to regulation by exchanges themselves and federal regulation there is
industry regulation. The Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1974 authorized the futures
industry to create registered futures associations with the CFTC. One such organization is the
National Futures Association (NFA). NFA is an industry wide, industry-supported, self-
regulatory organization for the futures industry. NFA enforces ethical standards and customer
protection rules, screens futures professionals for membership, credits and monitors futures
professionals for financial and general compliance rules and related activities.
FCMs and brokerage firms provide further regulation. Since they are responsible to
the exchange and clearinghouse for their customer’s transactions, they do a complete
investigation of the financial integrity of the customer prior to opening a trading account.
What criteria does the CFTC use to approve new futures contracts?
An exchange that wishes to trade a new futures contract must request approval from
the CFTC. Prior to this request the exchange has studied the feasibility of the proposed
7contract and received approval by its board of directors. The CFTC must determine that a
futures contract is in the public interest. In making this assessment, the CFTC examines how
the proposed contract would be used commercially for pricing and hedging to ensure that it
will serve an economic purpose.
The CFTC is concerned about the number of market participants, both buyers and
sellers, interested in hedging. Even more critical is the adequacy of speculator interest. As
mentioned earlier, hedging will not work without sufficient speculator activity. Sufficient
speculator activity is required to provide for market liquidity so a hedger may set or lift
his/her hedging position in a timely fashion.
What does the cheese futures contract look like?
Futures contracts are standard contracts. That is, there are no negotiations over
contract specifications. The only negotiation on the futures exchange is price. This is no
different than the standard cheese contract traded on the National Cheese Exchange. Most of
the specifications for the cheese futures contract are identical to the contract on the National
Cheese Exchange. Some important specifications for the cheese futures contract specifica-
tions are:
Trading Unit: One contract will be 40,000 pounds of 40-pound cheddar
blocks.
Price Basis: The price basis will be cents per pound FOB delivered
anywhere in the U.S. The cheese futures contract does
not have a specified delivery point.
Delivery Months: Futures contracts are traded every business day. But the
contract months, referred to as delivery months, are for
February, May, July, September and November. A trader
interested in hedging would choose the contract month
that best fits his/her cash market transaction.
Trading Hours: Trading hours will be from 2:15p.m. to 3:15p.m. New
York time.
Minimum Price Change: The smallest price change is 5/100 cents per pound or
$20 per 40,000 pound contract. That is, bids or offers
would be 5/100 cents per pound or more from the exis-
ting price on the exchange.
Standards: Standards are the product specifications. The 40 pound
cheddar blocks must be manufactured from pasteurized
8milk only and shall meet the requirements of USDA
Grade A or better. Blocks shall be colored and have a
standard moisture basis (37.8-39.0%). Delivered cheese
shall be 7 to 60 days old.
Last Trading Day: The last trading day is the final day when trading may
occur for a given cheese futures contract month. The last
trading day is the first Friday of the delivery month. For
example, the last trading day for a September cheese
futures contract would be the first Friday in September.
Futures contracts outstanding, that is not covered or
offset, must be settled by delivery of cheese no later than
the last business day of the delivery month.
Notice Day: If a trader intends to make actual delivery of cheese
rather than covering, he/she must give notice of intent to
deliver in fulfillment of a given month’s futures contract.
The clearinghouse will match this intent with the oldest
open long position (buyer) in the same delivery month.
For cheese futures contracts the notice day will be the
first business day following the last trading day.
Position Limits: These restrict the maximum number of contracts specu-
lators may hold in total and for any delivery month.
squeezes. No speculator may hold more than 1,000 con-
tracts on the same side of the market in all months com-
bined. The same limit applies to any delivery month
except the limit drops to 250 contracts within two weeks
of the last trading day.
What does it cost to trade futures contracts?
There are two primary costs to trade futures contracts; commission charged by the
broker and margin money. The broker commission is negotiable, and will vary among
brokers. Commissions vary with the extent of broker services provided the client, the size of
the trade, and the frequency of trading. It is usually beneficial to contact two or more brokers
to compare commission charges. The commission for a futures market transaction is for a
"round trip." That is, the cost for the initial trade of a contract and to cover or offset that contract.
The cost associated with margin money is the interest charge if margin money is
borrowed, interest lost if a trader’s own funds are used, or the difference in interest rates
between government securities and private investment opportunities if securities are posted as
margin. Depending upon the contract cheese price, required initial margin could range from
$3,000 to $4,000 per contract.
9Why is there interest in a cheese futures contract?
For the first 38 years of its existence (1950-1988), the federal dairy price support
program protected the dairy industry from price volatility. Under the federal dairy price
support program the support level for manufacturing milk is set based on legislative rules.
The announced support price is maintained by government purchases through the Commodity
Credit Corporation (CCC) of cheddar cheese (40# blocks, and 500# barrels), nonfat dry milk
and butter at specified prices.
Until the late 1970’s the federal dairy price support program worked much like a
buffer stock program. When milk production increased seasonally during the spring, CCC
purchases would prevent cheese, nonfat dry milk and butter prices and, in turn, manufacturing
milk prices, from falling far from support levels. Then, during late summer and fall, when
milk production was normally at its seasonal low and demand was relatively strong, the CCC
would sell cheese, nonfat dry milk and butter back to the commercial market at prices 110
percent of CCC purchase prices.
4 The sell-back activities kept dairy product prices and
manufacturing milk prices from rising sharply during the fall. The CCC purchase and sell
back activities provided stability and removed much of the market price risk.
From 1950 to 1981, the support level for manufacturing milk was set between 75 and
90 percent of parity. Under the parity formula the support price moved up slowly for the first
20 years, going from $3.05 per hundredweight in 1950 to $4.60 per hundredweight in 1970.
But between 1970 and 1980 the support price increased more than 2 1/2 times, from $4.66
per hundredweight to $13.10 per hundredweight. Dairy farmers responded with increased
milk production. By the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the level of milk surpluses, CCC
purchases and costs were deemed unacceptable by congress. Parity was abandoned in 1981
and replaced with congressional action to determine the support prices using the level of CCC
purchases and costs as the criteria. From 1981 to 1990 the support price was reduced eight
times, to $10.10 per hundredweight. Provisions in the 1990 Farm Bill will keep the support
price no lower than $10.10 through 1995, but probably no higher.
The $10.10 support price and associated CCC purchase prices for cheddar cheese
5,
nonfat dry milk and butter offer only a very low safety net to prices. Except for butter, the
prices of cheese, nonfat dry milk and, in turn, manufacturing milk prices will remain above
support levels most of the time due to market forces. The federal dairy price support
program no longer provides for price stability or assumes much of the market price risk.
4 The sell-back percentage of 110 percent of CCC purchase price has been adjusted from time to
time. Since early 1991, sell-back has been suspended as part of a package of administrative policies to
prop milk prices.
5 The CCC purchase price for 40# block cheddar cheese has been reduced from $1.395 per pound
in 1981 to the existing level of $1.1175 per pound.
10The result of the low milk support price level and the correspondingly low CCC
purchase price for cheddar cheese is greater price volatility for milk and cheese. During the
1960’s and early 1970’s the Minnesota-Wisconsin Price Series (M-W)
6 would change by no
more than 30 cents per hundredweight from low to high within a year and from one year to
the next. During the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, changes in the M-W were larger, and
almost exclusively positive because of large changes in the support price. Since 1988, the
situation has changed dramatically. The M-W price has been consistently above the support
level and highly variable (Figure 1). For example, in March, 1989 the M-W as $10.98 per
hundredweight. By December it had increased almost $4.00 to $14.93 per hundredweight. A
year later, December, 1990, the M-W had fallen $4.74 to $10.19 per hundredweight. During
1991, the M-W changed $2.48 per hundred weight from a low of $10.02 in March to a peak
of $12.50 in December. The M-W changed $1.61 per hundredweight in 1992 from a low of
$10.98 in March to a peak of $12.59 in July.
Figure 1
Increased variability in the M-W price is tied directly to increased variability in cheese
prices. About 90 percent of the change in the M-W can be explained by changes in cheese
prices. This is because nearly 70 percent of Minnesota’s manufacturing milk and nearly 90
percent of Wisconsin’s manufacturing milk is used for cheese. Under relatively high CCC
6 The price for Grade B milk, 3.5 percent milkfat, paid by Minnesota and Wisconsin butter, milk
powder and cheese plants.
11support prices for cheese and surplus cheese during 1980-1988, cheese prices stayed close to
support. For example, the average within-year change in National cheese Exchange prices for
40# cheddar blocks during 1980-1987 was 9 cents per pound, with a range from peak to low
of 2 cents to 17.5 cents per pound. With the current low CCC purchase price for cheese,
cheese prices have shown substantially greater fluctuations. The National Cheese Exchange
peak-to-low price change for 40# cheddar blocks was 37.74 cents per pound in 1990, 27 cents
in 1991 and 23.4 cents in 1992 (Figure 2).
Figure 2
Both cheese manufacturers and cheese buyers have a strong interest in using cheese
futures to reduce the market price risk associated with increased price volatility. Both have
suffered major economic losses from volatile cheese prices during the 1989-1992 period.
For cheese manufacturers, this price volatility would be less of a problem if the price
troughs occurred when cheese was being placed into inventory and the peaks occurred when
cheese was being sold out of inventory. In that case, the seasonal price rise would offset
storage costs. In 1989, this situation did occur. During the inventory building period of
March through June, 40# cheddar blocks increased from $1.1775 to $1.3525 per pound. Then
during the heavy sales period of October through early December, 40# cheddar blocks were
$1.5125 to $1.545 per pound.
In contrast to 1989, 1990 showed a counter-seasonal price pattern. The price of 40#
cheddar blocks was $1.2675 per pound in early March, peaked at $1.4675 per pound near the
12end of July, and then plummeted to a low of $1.0875 per pound by early November. This
drop of 38 cents per pound was financially devastating to cheese manufacturers, who had
earlier purchased milk to make cheese at prices that were much too high to support cheese
sales at the depressed fall prices. Cheese buyers holding large cheese inventories at the end
of July for fall sales were also hurt in the sense that competitors purchasing at the low fall
prices were at a substantial competitive advantage.
As we will demonstrate later, it may be possible for cheese sellers and buyers to
protect against rapid price movements in either direction through futures market hedging.
Hedging offers an opportunity for inventory holders to protect themselves against price
declines and an opportunity for cheese buyers to protect themselves against price increases.
Because of the close relationship between cheese prices and the M-W, cheese futures also
offer the potential for reducing the market price risk for dairy farmers as well.
Will a cheese futures market replace the National Cheese Exchange?
The cheese futures market is not a replacement for the National Cheese Exchange.
The National Cheese Exchange is a cash market for actual sale of cheese. The futures market
for cheddar cheese will trade contracts committing delivery or acceptance of cheese sometime
in the future. But this is not to say that no deliveries will occur. Some cash market cheese
traders may use the cheese futures in addition to or even instead of the National Cheese
Exchange in making their cheese selling and buying decisions.
Concern over the National Cheese Exchange partly motivated the recent interest in
cheese futures. The National Cheese Exchange is a "thin market." Less than 1 percent of the
cheddar blocks and cheddar barrels produced in the U.S. are actually sold on the Exchange.
Trading is also dominated by a few traders. Hence, the question arises as to whether the
opinion prices on the National Cheese Exchange adequately reflect the national market supply
and demand for cheese.
Cheese futures will broaden the price discovery process. Both cheese hedgers and
speculators will be continually evaluating supply and demand factors as well as other market
indicators. Based on their analysis and expectations of future price movements, trades will be
made and prices discovered. Once prices are discovered, the New York Coffee, Sugar and
Cocoa Exchange, Inc. will be responsible for disseminating these prices to the public on a
daily basis through market reports and newspapers.
The question may be asked, won’t the hedgers be the same players as those that trade
on the National Cheese Exchange? All of the traders in the National Cheese Exchange are
potential hedgers in the cheese futures market. Other cheese sellers and users who do not
currently trade on the National Cheese Exchange may also hedge using cheese futures. But
the largest complement of new players will be speculators. There is no speculator activity in
13the National Cheese Exchange. The addition of speculators in the cheese futures market adds
to the number of players involved in the price discovery process.
How can futures trading reduce market price risks?
Futures markets may be used to reduce market price risk. This is accomplished
through hedging. Hedging, as previously defined, is taking simultaneous but opposite or
offsetting transactions on the cash and futures markets.
In effect, hedging involves using futures contracts as a substitute for a future cash
market transaction. The hedger sells or buys futures contracts that are similar in volume to
anticipated cash market sales or purchases sometime later in time.
7 This futures market sale
or purchase is made in an attempt to "lock in" the price for the futures contract as the price
for the future cash market sale.
A manufacturer may try to lock in a finished product price objective through hedging.
On the cash market, the initial transaction is procuring raw product and manufacturing a
finished product, which is functionally equivalent to a purchase. To lock in the price
objective the initial and opposite position on the futures market will be a short sale, that is,
the manufacturer will sell a futures contract. The futures contract month chosen will be near
the time the cash sale will take place. Later, when the cash sale is made the short position on
the futures market will be covered or offset by the purchase of an identical futures contract.
Since opposite positions have been taken on the cash and futures market, any loss (gain) from
a price decline (increase) in the cash market would be offset from a gain (loss) on the futures
market if the predicted relationship between cash and futures market prices holds. If prices
had fallen (increased) an equal futures contract would have been purchased at a lower
(higher) price than the initial sell contract resulting in a gain (loss) on the futures. The net
result is the price objective is realized.
The relationship between cash and futures prices is related to basis, which is discussed
later. Cash and futures market prices for the same commodity do not always move together.
But they will converge or come together as the delivery date for the futures contract ap-
proaches. Convergence is assured through arbitrage between cash and futures markets. To
illustrate arbitrage, suppose the cash price for a commodity was well below the futures price
for exactly the same commodity a few weeks before the delivery date on the futures contract.
Arbitragers would buy cheap (the physical commodity) and sell dear (the futures contract).
This would bid up the cash price and pull down the futures price, thus causing convergence.
7 The futures contract volume and the cash market volume do not have to be identical in a hedging
transaction. In fact, hedgers will usually sell or buy futures contracts that total less than their expected
cash market sales or purchases. Futures contract volume in excess of expected cash market volume
represents speculation in the futures market.
14If the cash commodity was trading at a premium to the futures contract, opposite arbitrage
transactions would similarly pull the prices together.
Holders of inventory stand to incur losses from price declines. Obtaining inventory is
a purchase transaction on the cash market. The inventory price risk may be reduced by
initially taking a short (sell) position on the futures market. Later, when the inventory is sold
on the cash market, the short position would be covered by a purchase of an equal futures
contract. Any loss (gain) from a decline in inventory value would be offset by a gain (loss)
in the futures market.
A wholesaler could use hedging to offer a cash forward contract for its finished
product at a specified price. The market risk is that the seller will experience greater
acquisition costs than anticipated and losses or reduced profits will occur when the forward
price is received. Forward pricing on the cash market is a selling transaction. To protect
his/her profit objective from forward pricing, the seller would hedge by initially taking a long
position; i.e., buy a futures contract. Later, when the product is made and delivered on the
cash market at the forward price, the seller will sell an equal futures contract. If product
costs had increased (decreased), the loss (gain) in the cash market by selling at the forward
price would be offset by a gain (loss) in the futures market.
A buyer may use hedging to help ensure the cost of commodities purchased. For
example, a food processor may protect its profit margin objective by locking in ingredient
costs. The initial futures transaction would be a long position; buying a futures contract for
the commodity to be purchased on the cash market later. Later, when the commodity is
needed and purchased on the cash market, the futures position is covered by selling an equal
futures contract. If commodity prices had risen (fallen), the loss (gain) in the cash market
operation would be offset by the gain (loss) in the futures market.
The above discussion may lead one to believe that losses (gains) in the cash market
are exactly offset by gains (losses) on the futures market and that the price objective is
exactly realized. More likely than not, the net price result is not this perfect. The net price
could be lower or higher than the objective. It all depends upon what happens to the basis.
The basis is the difference between the cash price of a commodity and the price of the same
or similar futures contract. For purposes of hedging, basis is predicted when the hedge is
placed, and the actual basis may be different when the hedge is lifted. Transportation costs,
storage costs, and product characteristics that are different from futures contract specifications
make up the relevant basis pertaining to the cheddar cheese futures contract. These factors
may cause cash prices to be different from (higher or lower than) futures prices, and to
change in a manner different from futures prices.
Basis is calculated by subtracting the futures price from the cash price. Therefore, if
the cash price is higher than the futures price, then the basis is positive. If the futures price is
higher than the cash price, then the basis is negative. Regardless of whether it is positive or
15negative, basis is said to strengthen if the cash price rises relative to the futures price, and to
weaken if the cash price falls relative to the futures price.
Knowing and understanding the basis is essential for successful hedging. In hedging
transactions, the price or profit objective will differ from its expected value by any difference
between the expected basis and the actual basis when the hedge is lifted. For example,
suppose that in a short hedge (initial position is a sell), the seller expects the cash market
price for 40# block cheddar cheese to be 5 cents higher than the futures market price (+5-cent
basis) when the hedge is lifted. If the basis strengthens by 5 cents (the cash market price is
10 cents per pound higher than the futures price, the net price will be above the price
objective by 5 cents. If the basis had weakened by 5 cents (Cash market price equal to
futures market price), the net price will be 5 cents below the price objective. For a long
hedge (initial position is a buy), the opposite effects occur; the net price is exceeded when the
basis weakens and the net price is not achieved when the basis strengthens.
Hedging reduces market price risk, but basis risk, the risk the basis will be different
from what is predicted, always exists. Since basis is easier to forecast than prices, basis risk
is less than market price risk. Cheese futures contracts are new, and there is no available
historical information on basis for cheese. An understanding of cheese basis will improve
over time as futures trading in cheese takes place.
How could cheese manufacturers use futures trading to reduce risk?
We have talked in a general sense about how futures trading can be used to shift risk
to speculators. Now, let’s look at some specific examples of how hedging can be used to
"lock in" a price to a cheese plant.
First, let’s consider a simple case of how a plant might hedge to forward price
expected cheese production. This involves the sale of futures contracts equal in volume to
the amount of cheese production at a future time. Assume that in July 1993, Aceinthehole
Cooperative expects to make and sell 200,000# of cheddar blocks in the month of November.
Management is worried about a repeat of October 1990, when cheddar cheese prices dropped
20 cents per pound in a single trading session on the National Cheese Exchange, and wants to
protect its manufacturing margin. In July, the November cheddar cheese contract is trading at
$1.20/#, which is higher than what Aceinthehole thinks the cash price for its cheese will be in
November.
Under these circumstances, the appropriate action is to sell 5 November futures con-
tracts @ $1.20. This is known as a "short" sale, or "going short in the market" -- Acein-
thehole is selling cheese that it hasn’t even produced yet. Five contracts is equal in volume
to Aceinthehole’s expected inventory of cheddar cheese in November (5 X 40,000# =
200,000#). In effect, Aceinthehole is forward selling the stock of cheese it expects to have in
November in the month of July, using the futures market. Through its futures market sale,
16the cooperative has sold the right to deliver 200,000# of cheese in November at a price of
$1.20 per pound.
Aceinthehole does not receive the value of its cheese when it sells the commitment to
deliver. It has only sold the commitment, and will have realized any potential benefits until it
makes delivery or offsets its futures market position with a purchase.
Now, lets see what happens when November rolls around. We’ll look at two cases.
In the first case, let’s suppose that Aceinthehole’s pessimistic forecast about November cheese
prices materializes. The November futures price is $1.10/#, 10 cents less than when the
cooperative sold the five contracts. Aceinthehole buys 5 November futures contracts @ $1.10
to offset its previous sale and close out its short futures position. Since it sold the contract
for 10 cents per pound more than what it bought it for, it gains $20,000 on its futures market
transaction (we are ignoring brokerage fees). Aceinthehole still has 200,000# of cheese to get
rid of, which it sells in the cash market for $1.10/#, yielding $220,000. The sum of futures
market profits ($20,000) and cash market sales revenue is $240,000. Dividing by 200,000# of
cheese shows a per pound revenue of $1.20, which is the price that the cooperative wanted to
lock in.
This sounds good, but what if Aceinthehole’s November price forecast was pessimis-
tic, and that an unanticipated shortage of cheese causes the cash market and the futures
market to go up? That’s case II. The November futures price is $1.50/#. Aceinthehole has
to buy 5 November contracts @ $1.50, which means it loses 30 cents per pound, or $60,000
on its futures market transactions!
8 But, at the same time, it can sell its 200,000# of cheese
at $1.50 per pound, giving it $300,000 in receipts. The combination of futures market losses
and cash market sales gives total revenue of $240,000, or $1.20 per pound -- exactly the price
that Aceinthehole was trying to lock in.
Looking at both cases, Aceinthehole has assured itself of $1.20 per pound on its
November cheese inventory, regardless of which way the market moves. If the market goes
down, then futures market gains offset cash market losses. If prices rise, then cash market
gains offset futures market losses.
Perceptive readers may already have noticed that we have stacked the deck in these
two examples. We assumed that the cash and futures market prices were equal at the time
the futures commitment was covered or "closed out." The equality of cash and futures market
prices is not important, but this "perfect hedge" does require that the difference between the
cash and futures remains at the level anticipated when the hedge was placed. In other words,
we assumed that the BASIS was constant. As we noted above, that may not be the case.
8 The cooperative will also have to post additional margin with its broker as the price moves
against it.
17If the relationship between cash and futures prices is different from what was
expected, then hedgers could experience corresponding losses or profits. But regardless of
what happens to basis, the seller of a futures contract always has the option of making
delivery on its futures market commitment. In either of the two cases above, Aceinthehole
can delivery its 200,000# of cheese to the buyer(s) of its futures contract at the $1.20 per
pound price. Since the contract specifies delivery anywhere in the United States, the
cooperative will not experience any delivery costs. Consequently, the $1.20 per pound price
is an assured price -- Aceinthehole has locked in its price.
To complicate things a bit more, let’s look at a case where the cheese manufacturer
sells a product that is different from the cheddar cheese specified in the futures contract.
We’ll assume that Aceinthehole sells aged cheddar, which trades at a premium to 7-60 day
cheddar. In this case, hedging is still a good strategy to reduce price risk, but the basis will
be positive and basis risk will be greater. Moreover, Aceinthehole cannot deliver against its
futures commitment because it does not have cheese that meets the contract specification.
This same case applies to manufacturers of cheese varieties other than cheddar. The prices
for other cheeses will move with cheddar cheese prices, but the normal basis may be positive
or negative and there will be greater basis risk.
Assume that in July 1993, Aceinthehole has 120,000 pounds of cheddar cheese in its
warehouse that it intends to age and sell in November. Storage and opportunity costs are 2.5
cents per pound per month, so the cooperative needs at least a ten cent premium over the
young cheddar price in November to cover its aging costs. We’ll also assume that in
Aceinthehole’s area, the normal basis (cash price for young cheddar minus futures price) is 5
cents per pound. If Aceinthehole is a Midwestern cooperative, this is a realistic assumption.
The cheddar cheese futures contract is likely to reflect the cash market in the lowest-price
major cheese producing region, which is California. Hence, the normal basis (for cheese 7-60
days old) in other regions would be expected to be positive and less than or equal to the cost
of transporting cheese from California.
Under these conditions, Aceinthehole’s expected basis is 15 cents per pound. The
cooperative wants to hedge its inventory value using the November cheddar cheese contract.
It sells 3 November contracts @ $1.20. Adding its expected basis of 15 cents yields an
expected cash market price for its aged cheddar of $1.35 per pound. This is Aceinthehole’s
price objective.
In November, let’s assume that the cheese futures market has fallen to $1.15 per
pound and that the cash price for aged cheddar is $1.25 per pound. The basis has weakened
to 10 cents per pound from its anticipated 15 cents. Aceinthehole sells its aged cheddar for
$1.25 cents per pound, losing 10 cents per pound relative to its price objective. The
cooperative covers its futures commitment by buying 3 contracts @ $1.15, making 5 cents per
pound profit. The net result is a loss of 5 cents per pound relative to the price objective.
Because the basis weakened (cash price relative to futures price was less than expected),
Aceinthehole’s, futures market gain did not completely offset its cash market loss.
18How could a cheese buyer use futures trading to reduce risk?
Now, let’s flip the coin to look at how a cheese buyer might lock in it’s price. Again,
we will assume a perfect hedge, that is, that cash and futures market price coincide or that the
basis is constant relative to expectations.
Let’s assume that in July 1993, Mightyfine Cheese Distributors signs a contract with
Realbig Grocers to deliver 200,000# of random-cut cheddar cheese in November 1993 at a
fixed price of $1.50/#. Mightyfine’s costs for cutting, wrapping, procurement, delivery, and
overhead are $0.30/#. The November cheddar cheese contract is trading at $1.20/#.
The hedge in this case involves a purchase of futures contracts. Mightyfine buys 5
November contracts @ $1.20. It takes a long position in the futures market by purchasing
November futures contracts equal in volume to the amount of cheese it actually wants to buy
in November to meet its contract with Realbig. This means that the company has purchased a
commitment to receive 200,000# of cheddar cheese at a price of $1.20 per pound. Adding its
margin of 30 cents per pound indicates that it Mightyfine can procure block cheddar at $1.20
per pound, it can sell profitably at $1.50 per pound.
Again, we’ll look at two cases. In the first case, assume that the futures price for
block cheddar in November is $1.10, 10 cents per pound below what Mightyfine paid for the
contract. Mightyfine closes out its long futures position by selling 5 November contacts @
$1.10. It loses 10 cents per pound, or $20,000 on this transaction (again, we are ignoring
brokerage charges). At the same time, Mightyfine buys 200,000 pounds of block cheddar at
$1.10 per pound to meet its commitment to Realbig Grocers. Its cost of cheese is only
$220,000 compared to the $240,000 it expected to pay. Hence, Mightyfine’s total cost,
considering both cash and futures market transactions, is the $220,000 it paid for cheese in
the cash market plus its $20,000 loss in the futures market for a total of $240,000, or $1.20
per pound -- exactly the price that it was trying to lock in.
In case II, we’ll assume that the November futures price rises to $1.50 per pound, 30
cents per pound above what Mightyfine paid for the contract. Mightyfine closes out its long
futures position by selling 5 November contracts @ $1.50. It gains 30 cents per pound, or
$60,000, on the transaction. But it has to buy cheese to meet its contract obligation to
Realbig at $1.50 per pound, for a total cost of $300,000. Mightyfine’s total cost in this case
is the $300,000 cash market purchase less the $60,000 futures market profit for a net of
$240,000 -- $1.20 per pound.
Again, we are assuming away basis risk. But Mightyfine does not have to close out
its futures market position. It can elect to take delivery on the cheese that it has purchased in
the futures market. This will ensure the $1.20 per pound cost, but Mightyfine will have to
pay for the cost of transporting the cheese from the delivery point chosen by the seller of the
contract.
19What we have described so far are routine hedges as well as perfect hedges. The
hedges are perfect in the sense that basis risk is assumed away. The hedges are routine in the
sense that the hedgers were assumed to hold on to their futures positions (commitments to
deliver or receive cheese) until they engage in offsetting cash market transactions (selling or
buying cheese). In real life, hedgers would likely employ a selective hedging strategy,
closing out their futures positions if and when the direction of price movements becomes
clear and it becomes costly to stay hedged. For example, in the short hedge illustration,
Aceinthehole would be ill-advised to maintain its short position in the futures market when it
becomes apparent that cheese prices are unquestionably on the rise. The firm is losing money
with every up-tick of the market, since it will have to buy back its futures contracts at an
increasingly higher price. By buying back its futures contracts, it will lose money on its
futures transaction, but it can avoid even larger losses (at the expense of risking a subsequent
cash price decline).
Similarly, when it becomes apparent that cheese prices are unquestionably falling
below the "locked in" price, long hedgers like Mightyfine will want to close out their futures
position to save money on their futures transactions and benefit from the bear market on their
cash purchases.
We need to inject words of caution about prematurely lifting hedges. To repeat,
hedges should be lifted only when it becomes apparent that prices are unquestionably moving
against the hedger. Lifting a short hedge only to have prices plummet could be very costly.
Remember that an unhedged position in the cash market represents speculation, and specula-
tors can be burned.
How could dairy farmers benefit from futures trading?
There are several answers to this question. First and most simply, reduced inventory
price risk will benefit cooperatives and, therefore, their members. The ability to hedge
against inventory losses will improve the bottom lines of cooperatives engaged in manufac-
turing cheese by allowing them to shift the risk of inventory losses to speculators and long
hedgers. But farmers can benefit in other ways. A futures market for cheese allows cheese
manufacturers to forward price milk, something that has not been possible in the past. Let’s
look at how forward pricing might work.
On July 1, 1993, Realgood Cheese Factory initiates a revolutionary milk pricing
program. It will sign fixed price contracts with dairy farmers. The price per hundredweight
that Realgood will pay is 10 times the futures price for cheddar cheese in any month the
farmer selects minus $1.50. Farmers cannot change their pricing month until the delivery
date for that contract month, and they cannot receive any more than the contracted price; the
contract is a fixed price contract, not a minimum price contract.
20Farmer A signs up for the program on July 1 and picks November 1993 as her pricing
month. The November cheddar cheese contract is trading at $1.45, so her contract price is
$13.00 per hundredweight. Farmer A produces 400,000# of milk per month.
After the contract is signed, Realgood has a fixed financial obligation of $260,000 to
Farmer A (5 months X 4,000 Cwt. @ $13.00). To hedge that obligation, Realgood sells 5
November contracts @ $1.45, representing a total value of $290,000. The difference
represents a make and storage allowance of 15 cents per pound of cheese, assuming a 10
pound yield.
If the price that Realgood can get for cheddar cheese on the cash market between July
and November 1993 is consistently below $1.45/#, then Realgood can deliver the cheese
produced with Farmer A’s milk against the contract. Alternatively (and more likely),
Realgood can sell in the cash market (at less than $1.45) and buy back its futures contracts
(also less than $1.45), offsetting cash market losses with futures market gains.
If the cash prices goes above $1.45, Realgood sells at the higher price and buys back
an equivalent amount of the short sell (or lifts the hedge if it is confident that cash prices will
remain above $1.45).
How can this work? How can Realgood guarantee a price when it has no idea what
the milk market is going to do? What happens if there is a drought or a big surplus of milk,
moving milk prices rapidly up or down?
To answer these questions, you may want to work through some examples with rising
and falling cheese and milk prices. But the concept is really quite simple. Realgood is
protecting itself against a falling milk market by hedging its purchase of milk in the cheese
market. Realgood will make cheese from Farmer A’s milk. It can make about 10 pounds of
cheese per hundredweight of milk that it buys from Farmer A. Realgood simply converts the
amount of milk in its contract with Farmer A to cheese equivalent, and then hedges that
equivalent in the futures market through a short sale of cheese. If cheese prices fall from the
level specified in the pricing month, then Realgood offsets cash market losses with futures
market gains.
But what if cheese prices go up? That really doesn’t matter, since the pricing contract
is for a fixed milk price. Realgood’s hedge assures it’s ability to pay $13.00 per hundred-
weight, no less and no more, as long as the expected basis materializes.
9
9 With a routine hedge, Realgood can only employ a fixed price contract. However, Realgood
could use a minimum price guarantee by selling put options instead of futures contracts. Options
trading represents a more sophisticated and more complex risk management strategy. We will discuss
cheddar cheese options in a subsequent Marketing and Policy Briefing Paper.
21Basis in this case is the difference between the gross value of 10 pounds of milk to
the cheese plant and the cheddar cheese futures price. This is considerably more complex
than the notion of basis when dealing with hedges that involve cheese as specified in the
futures contract. And this basis is more likely to be variable and subject the plant to basis
risk. Factors influencing the milk-cheese basis include cheese yields, byproduct values (whey
cream and whey solids), and plant costs.
One other problem: What if Farmer A produces less than 400,000 pounds of milk in a
month, which is less than the cheese equivalent of the 40,000 pound cheddar cheese futures
contract that Realgood needs to sell in order to hedge the price guarantee? What is important
to making this forward milk pricing program work is not the milk production of any one
patron, but the combined volume of all patrons who select a particular pricing month. For a
typical cheese plant, it is likely that the aggregate milk volume being priced would be
equivalent to several cheddar cheese contracts.
A third way that farmers can benefit from a futures market for cheese is through direct
cross hedging. From the example above, it is obvious that Realgood is protecting itself in its
guaranteed milk price program by hedging in the futures market. Realgood knows that it can
get about 10 pounds of cheese from each hundredweight of milk it processes. So it can short
sell cheese equivalent to the amount of milk it needs to produce that cheese. Hedging cheese
to protect against a milk price obligation is known as a cross hedge. Realgood is using a
cross hedge to ensure its ability to pay a fixed price for milk. That is something that some
dairy farmers can do themselves, either individually or collectively. But remember that cross
hedging involves greater basis risk than hedging in the same commodity
Let’s look at a dairy farmer cross-hedge. Suppose that Farmer A sees what Realgood
Cheese Factory is up to, and decides that she is just as capable of locking in a price as Real-
good. She figures that, based on historical evidence, a cheddar cheese price of $1.45 per
pound should result in an M-W price of $13.00, and that the Grade A price for her milk
normally runs $1.00 higher than the M-W. She also figures that milk prices are likely to be
down this fall, and an M-W of $14.00 would look pretty good. She wants to lock in that
price by cross-hedging against the November cheddar cheese contract, which is trading on
July 1 at $1.45/#.
To cross hedge, Farmer A sells 1 November cheddar cheese contract @ $1.45. She
has sold a commitment to deliver 40,000# of block cheddar at a price of $1.45. Of course,
Farmer A does not make cheese, and she has no intention of making delivery on the contract.
She is using the short sale to hedge her anticipated milk production in November.
November rolls around. Let’s first assume that the November futures price for 40#
block cheddar is $1.10/#, a whopping 35 cents per pound under the price when Farmer A sold
short. To close out her futures position. Farmer A buys 1 November contract @ $1.10,
making $14,000 (less brokerage fees) on her futures transaction.
22That’s the good news. But while the cheese futures was falling in the tank, the milk
price was falling just as rapidly. Farmer A finds that the M-W price in November is $9.50
per hundredweight and her Grade A price is $10.50. So she can sell her 400,000# of milk for
only $42,000.
But things are not that bad. Adding the $14,000 profit in the futures market to the
$42,000 revenue from milk sales yields $56,000. Dividing total revenue by milk marketed
(4,000 hundredweight) yields $14.00 per hundredweight -- Farmer A’s original price objec-
tive.
But suppose the cheese and milk markets rose? Suppose the November futures price
for cheese is $1.60/#? In that case, Farmer A buys 1 November contract @ $1.60. Her loss
on the futures transaction is 15 cents per pound, or $6,000. But at the same time, the M-W
price has risen to $14.50 and Farmer A’s Grade A price is $15.50, meaning that she makes
$62,000 on her 4,000 hundredweight of milk. Adding milk sales and futures transaction
losses yields $56,000, or $14.00 per hundredweight -- the price objective.
Again, we have simplified this example by assuming no basis risk, that is, that the
Grade A milk price for Farmer A has a perfectly predictable relationship to the cheese futures
price. As noted before, a perfectly predictable basis is unlikely in a cross hedge, where the
two commodities are not identical. Several things could cause the basis to vary from
expectations, and therefore cause Farmer A’s hedge to either make or lose money. For
example, cheese manufacturing margins could increase or decrease from normal, or the Grade
A premium could change relative to expectations.
But while there is basis risk in cross hedging farm milk against cheddar cheese
futures, cheese prices and milk prices do move closely together. That’s because all milk
prices are tied closely to the M-W price through federal order pricing rules (see Figure 3).
And cheese prices are very highly correlated with the M-W price because of the importance
of cheese manufacturing in the states of Minnesota and Wisconsin, where the M-W price is
collected (Figure 4).
By now, you might be saying that 400,000 pounds is a lot of milk. Most Wisconsin
herds, for example, produce less than 1 million pounds in an entire year. Will cross-hedging
by dairy farmers be limited to very large producers? The answer is, not necessarily.
Obviously, large producers are more likely to have monthly milk sales equivalent in volume
to a 40,000 pound cheddar cheese futures contract. But existing dairy cooperatives could
assist their members by pooling marketings and placing and lifting hedges based on their
combined marketings. Alternatively, specialized cooperatives might be formed for the
specific purpose of managing dairy farmers’ price risk through futures trading.
23Also, remember that contracts for future delivery can be bought and sold as long as 18
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months prior to their expiration (delivery) date. If a dairy farmer’s expected milk marketings
between the time of futures contract sale and the delivery month are greater than 400,000
pounds, then the farmer can engage in cross hedging. But this kind of cross hedge would be
subject to considerable basis risk. That’s because the smaller farmer would be selling milk in
the cash market (to a dairy plant) continuously for a long period before expiration of its
futures contact. Monthly cash prices could vary substantially around the hedged price
objective. Also, the hedger in this case might be obligated to frequently meet margin calls
over the long hedge period.
Will using the futures market to hedge or cross hedge guarantee a profit?
Absolutely not! Hedging is a means of managing risk, not a means of guaranteeing a
profit. Obviously, if costs are less than prices locked in through hedging, the difference
represents profit. But the prices that are locked in through hedging may not be profitable
prices. The examples we have used assumed price levels that might generally be considered
profitable. But we could just as well have used lower milk and cheese prices that were
clearly unprofitable to dairy farmers. The futures market gains and losses would not change,
but the bottom lines to hedgers would.
24In other words, hedging is a risk management tool that should be used if and only if it
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can help increase profits or decrease losses. If hedging would only serve to lock in a loss,
then hedging wouldn’t make economic sense unless the loss could be even larger without
hedging.
Will futures trading in cheese increase cheese and milk prices?
No. Cheese prices are determined by fundamental forces of supply and demand for
cheese. In turn, milk prices are the product of supply and demand for cheese and other dairy
products. Futures trading will not change these fundamental factors.
Futures prices represent the collective opinion of traders as to future cash market
supply and demand conditions. The cash and futures markets are distinct and separated by
time. Cash market and futures market prices coincide only at the time the futures contract
expires, that is, when they represent the same point in time.
25Will futures trading in cheese reduce the volatility in cheese and milk prices?
Maybe, maybe not. Again, cash market fundamentals dictate cash market prices.
Expectations of future cash market fundamentals dictate futures market prices. The increased
volatility of cheese prices in recent years is a result of the dairy price support level being
lowered to the point that it seldom if ever serves as a price floor. To the extent that supply
and demand factors cause cash market prices for cheese to change rapidly, futures market
trading will not change price volatility.
But some argue that hedged cheese manufacturers may be more willing to hold cheese
inventories, rather than selling at reduced prices, during forecasts of possible increased cheese
supplies and lower prices. This could serve to stabilize cash market prices. However, if
increased cheese supplies become a reality, market forces will lower cheese prices. Cheese
futures trading should be viewed as a market tool to manage market price risk in an environ-
ment of price volatility, not as a means to reduce volatility.
Will futures trading really help the dairy industry?
If futures trading won’t raise milk prices or guarantee a profit and probably won’t
diminish price volatility, then what good is it for dairy farmers? We’ve answered that
question before, but it bears repeating: Futures trading provides a tool to manage price risk.
If dairy cooperatives and dairy farmers use that tool, then they can benefit by locking in
cheese and milk prices in advance. If they do not use that tool, then they are neither better
off nor worse off than without a forward contract market.
It is important to stress the last point. Some dairy farmers and others have expressed
the concern that futures markets are nothing more than legalized gambling casinos; that
rampant speculation in cheese futures contracts can only hurt dairy farmers; that only large
dairy interests will use the futures market, and only in ways that spell trouble for dairy
farmers. While there is no experience in cheese futures trading to refute these concerns,
neither is there any evidence before the fact that cheese futures trading will have any effect
on cash prices for cheese.
We can’t at this time predict who will trade futures contracts. Nor can we say
whether trading activity will be adequate to support widespread hedging, or whether farmers
or small cheese plants will take the time necessary to learn how to effectively hedge. But we
can say that there is potentially something to be gained and nothing to be lost through the
introduction of a cheese futures contract.
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More Hedging Examples and Some Hedging Morals
Example #1: Forward price expected block cheddar cheese production
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
July 1993 Expected Nov. 1993 cheddar SELL 1 Nov. contract $0.05
cheese production is 40,000#. @ $1.20
Normal local basis is $.05
Price objective is $1.25
Case I - Futures price decline/no basis change:
Nov. 1993 Sell 40,000# of 7-38 day BUY 1 Nov. contract $0.05
cheddar blocks @ $1.15 @ $1.10
Gain/(Loss) ($0.10) $0.10
Net Gain $0.00
Case II - Futures price increase/no basis change:
Nov. 1993 Sell 40,000# of 7-38 day BUY 1 Nov. contract $0.05
cheddar blocks @ $1.40 @ $1.35
Gain/(Loss) $0.15 ($0.15)
Net Gain $0.00
Case III - Futures price decline/basis weakens:
Nov. 1993 Sell 40,000# of 7-38 day BUY 1 Nov. contract $0.03
cheddar blocks @ $1.13 @ $1.10
Gain/(Loss) ($0.12) $0.10
Net Gain ($0.02) = basis change
Moral: · Hedging eliminates risk only if there is no change in basis. Basis chang-
es can result in losses to hedgers (relative to price objective). The basis
in this case is small and predictable because the commodity specifications
in the cash and futures markets are the same.
27Example #2: Protect value of aged cheese inventory
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
July 1993 Inventory of 40,000# of SELL 1 Nov. contract $0.15
cheddar blocks for sale @ $1.20
as aged cheddar in Nov.
Normal premium over young
cheddar is $0.10 plus
location premium of $0.05.
Price objective is $1.35.
Case I - Futures price decline/basis strengthens:
Nov. 1993 Sell 40,000# of aged BUY 1 Nov. contract $0.20
cheddar blocks @ $1.30 @ $1.10
Gain/(Loss) ($0.05) $0.10
Net Gain $0.05 = basis change
Case II - Futures price increase/basis weakens:
Nov. 1993 Sell 40,000# of aged BUY 1 Nov. contract $0.12
cheddar blocks @ $1.37 @ $1.25
Gain/(Loss) $0.02 ($0.05)
Net Gain ($0.03) = basis change
Moral: · Here, the basis includes an anticipated aging premium, which contributes
to basis risk. In general, the more different the cash commodity from the
futures commodity, the larger the basis risk
· Basis risk is not always bad. If the basis moves in favor of the hedger
(strengthens for a short hedge; weakens for a long hedge), then there will
be a gain relative to the price objective.
· A strengthened basis always helps a short hedge (the hedger receives
more relative to the futures price than expected); a weakened basis
always hurts a short hedge (the hedger receives less relative to the futures
price than expected).
28Example #3: Forward price Mozzarella cheese production
1
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
July 1993 Mozzarella cheese maker SELL 1 Nov. contract ($0.10)
expects to have 40,000# @ $1.20
of high-moisture product
to sell in Nov. Normal
discount for high-moisture
Mozzarella relative to young
cheddar is $0.10. Price
objective is $1.10.
Case I - Futures price decline/no basis change:
Nov. 1993 Sell 40,000# of product BUY 1 Nov. contract ($0.10)
@ $1.05 @ $1.15
Gain/(Loss) ($0.05) $0.05
Net Gain $0.00
Case II - No Futures price change/basis weakens
Nov. 1993 Sell 40,000# of product BUY 1 Nov. contract ($0.15)
@ $1.05 @ $1.20
Gain/(Loss) ($0.05) ($0.00)
Net Gain ($0.05) = basis change
Moral: · Even with no change in the futures market price, basis risk may still
result in a loss (or profit) to hedgers.
· Weakening of the basis means that cash prices are lower relative to
futures prices than expected. When the basis is negative, a weakened
basis means that the difference between cash and futures prices becomes
greater. When the basis is positive, basis weakening means that the cash
and futures prices get closer together.
1 This example uses high-moisture Mozzarella, which may trade at a discount to block cheddar, in
order to illustrate a negative basis. Regular Mozzarella would sell at a premium to block cheddar
29Example #4: Lock in raw product cost for fixed price contract
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
July 1993 Processed cheese maker BUY 1 Nov. contract $0.05
signs contract to deliver @ $1.20
25,000# of cheese powder
to a snack food manufacturer
in November. Needs 40,000#
of fresh cheddar blocks to
make the powder (38% moisture
in raw product/0.5% moisture in
finished product). Local basis is
normally $.05. Signs contract to
sell powder @ $2.50 per pound based
on November futures price of $1.20.
Case I - Futures price decline/no basis change:
Nov. 1993 Buy 40,000# of cheddar blocks SELL 1 Nov. contract $0.05
@ $1.20. Make and sell 25,000# @$1.15
of cheese powder @$2.50
Gain/(Loss) $0.05 ($0.05)
Net Gain $0.00
Case II - No Futures price change/basis weakens:
Nov. 1993 Buy 40,000# of cheddar blocks SELL 1 Nov. contract $0.04
@ $1.24. Make and sell 25,000# @ $1.20
of cheese powder @ $2.50
Gain/(Loss) $0.01 $0.00
Net Gain $0.01 = basis change
Moral: · A long hedge protects buyers from price increases in the same way that a
short hedge protects sellers from price decreases.
· A strengthened basis always hurts a long hedge (the hedger must pay
more relative to the futures market than expected); a weakened basis
always helps a long hedge (the hedger pays less relative to the futures
market than expected).
30Example #5: Dairy farmer hedge
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
July 1993 Dairy farmer hedges expected SELL 1 Nov. contract $0.025
November milk production using @ $1.20
November cheddar cheese futures.
Expects to sell 400,000 pounds
of milk. Local basis is $.05.
M-W price expected to be $1.00
less than 10 times the local
cheddar block price. Grade A
milk price expected to exceed
M-W price by $.75/Cwt. Price
objective for milk is $12.25/Cwt.,
equivalent to $1.225/# cheddar
block price.
C a s eI-N ofutures price change/basis strengthens:
Nov. 1993 Sell 400,000# of Grade A milk BUY 1 Nov. contract $0.05
@ $12.50/Cwt. @ $1.20
Gain/(Loss) $0.025 $0.00
Net Gain $0.025 = basis change (= $.25/Cwt. gain)
Case II - Futures price decline/basis weakens:
Nov. 1993 Sell 400,000# of Grade A milk BUY 1 Nov. contract $0.005
@ $11.55/Cwt. @ $1.15
Gain/(Loss) ($0.07) $0.05
Net Gain ($0.02) = basis change (= $.20/Cwt. loss)
Moral: · There are many components making up the basis in a complex cross-
hedge like this one. Therefore, there are many things than can make the
basis different from what is predicted when the hedge is placed.
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More on Basis
We have stressed the importance of understanding basis for successful hedging, and
we have shown how hedges are affected when the basis is different from expectations. In this
appendix, we expand our discussion of what makes up basis and, therefore, what creates basis
risk. We also provide some historical price data related to possible basis risk in a raw milk
hedge using the block cheddar futures contract.
Basis is the difference between the cash market price of the commodity being hedged
and the futures market price for the relevant contract. While basis can be calculated at any
time in reference to any delivery month, the important basis for protecting a price objective
through hedging is the predicted difference between the cash price and the hedge month
futures contract price when the hedge is expected to be lifted. Basis is estimated when the
hedge is set. The possibility that the basis will be different from the estimate when the hedge
is lifted and an offsetting cash market transaction is made represents basis risk.
If the hedge is held until the delivery month, the basis will be small and predictable if
the cash commodity is exactly the same as the futures commodity. That’s because cash and
futures prices converge in the delivery month because of actual or potential arbitrage trading
between cash and futures markets.
If the hedge is lifted between futures market delivery months, then the basis is more
unpredictable. There is no experience in cheese futures trading. We don’t know whether
cash prices for cheddar cheese in mid-August, for example, will generally be higher that the
September futures price (inverted market) or lower (carrying charge market). Adding
uncertainty to the between-delivery month basis is the fact that cheese production is con-
tinuous but seasonal. Only trading experience -- and perhaps several years worth -- will
provide us with guidance on this issue.
For hedges involving young cheddar cheese blocks, the only factor affecting basis is
transportation cost from the lowest-price region. Since there are no delivery points specified
in the cheddar cheese contract, the futures price will reflect the region where delivering on
the futures contract would be the cheapest; that is, where the cash commodity can be acquired
at the lowest cost. Recently, cheddar cheese prices have been lowest in California, where a
state marketing order keeps cheese milk costs low and where surplus cheese must be
transported long distances to find a market. The local basis for young cheddar cheese blocks
in the region with the lowest cash market prices will be about zero. In other regions, cheese
prices will be higher, and therefore the basis will generally be positive. But note that the
basis could change with changes in local cheese supply and demand conditions, since the
futures market pricing region will change with changing regional price relationships.
At least for part of the year, it is possible that the cheddar cheese futures price would
reflect the National Cheese Exchange as an implicit delivery point. The National Cheese
32Exchange "opinion" for block cheddar is usually lower than what sellers in most regions are
being paid for cheddar blocks, and the Exchange may lead the market during price reversals.
For cheddar cheese that does not match the specifications of the cheddar cheese
futures contract, the basis will reflect, on average, the price differences between the cash
commodity and block cheddar cheese. That difference would be negative for barrel cheddar,
reflecting lower manufacturing costs, and positive for aged cheddar blocks, reflecting higher
storage costs. Similarly, the basis for non-cheddar varieties will generally be positive. Since
many cheese varieties are priced in reference to the National Cheese Exchange block cheddar
price, there may not be substantial basis risk in hedges involving non-cheddar cheeses. But
basis risk will increase the more different the cheese is from block cheddar.
Calculation of basis becomes more complex in cross hedging milk against the cheddar
block contract. Since over 40 percent of all milk is used for cheese, there is obviously a
strong correlation between cheese and milk prices. Also, fluid milk, which absorbs another
40 percent of milk, is priced in reference to the Minnesota-Wisconsin price, which reflects
milk value in two major cheese states. Nonetheless, the relationship between milk prices and
cheese prices is variable, leading to basis risk for dairy farmers involved in cross hedging.
The calculation of a milk/cheese cross hedge basis is illustrated below:
$1.25 per pound Futures price quote for delivery month
Plus + 0.05 per pound Local Basis (normal amount by which block ched-
dar cheese price exceeds futures price in
the delivery month)
Equals 1.30 per pound Local block cheddar price
Times 10.00 pounds Approximate cheese yield per Cwt. of milk
Equals $13.00 per Cwt. Cheese value to plant
Plus + 0.50 per Cwt. Byproduct value to plant (whey cream and solids)
Equals 13.50 per Cwt. Gross value of milk used to produce cheese
Minus - 1.00 per Cwt. Manufacturing margin (make allowance)
Equals 12.50 per Cwt. Net value to milk producers
Plus + 0.75 per Cwt. Grade A price premium
Equals 13.25 per Cwt. Milk price objective
Divided by 10.00 pounds Approximate cheese yield per Cwt. of milk
Equals $1.325 per pound Equivalent cheese price objective
Minus -$1.250 per pound Futures price
Equals $0.075 per pound Imputed Basis
33There are several components of this margin that are subject to considerable risk. The
local basis may vary from the expected nickel because of abnormal supply and demand
conditions for cheese. Cheese yield varies seasonally and with weather and other factors.
Byproduct values are subject to the uncertainties of butter and whey product markets.
Manufacturing margins are influenced by unpredictable competitive conditions. Premiums are
influenced by fluid milk utilization and a host of other variables.
Appendix Table 1 provides some insights into the variability of selected prices making
up basis. Appendix Figure 1 shows the price differences in graphical form. Note that some
of the series demonstrate long-term trends (the Wisconsin Assembly Point 40# Block Cheddar
price Minus the National Cheese Exchange 40# Block Cheddar price; Wisconsin Grade A
milk price minus the Minnesota-Wisconsin Manufacturing Milk price [M-W price]). Others
show a pronounced seasonal pattern (M-W price minus Gross Cheese Value per Hundred-
weight; M-W price minus 10 times the National Cheese Exchange 40# Block Cheddar price).
These tendencies can help predict basis.
Appendix Figure 1
34Appendix Table 1. Selected prices relevant to computing basis in cheese and milk hedges.
NCE Wis Assy Wis Gross WAP WIS-A M-W M-W
40# Point 40# Grade A Cheese Minus Minus Minus Minus
Year Month Blocks Blocks Milk M-W




Cents per Lb. Dollars per Cwt. $/Lb. Dollars per Cwt.
Value Blocks
1 121.95 123.80 11.68 11.12 13.08 0.018 0.56 -1.96 -1.08
2 123.44 124.50 11.63 11.04 13.20 0.011 0.59 -2.16 -1.30
3 123.50 123.20 11.58 11.02 13.19 -0.003 0.56 -2.17 -1.33
4 124.00 125.00 11.53 10.98 13.26 0.010 0.55 -2.28 -1.42
5 124.15 126.00 11.52 10.98 13.34 0.018 0.54 -2.36 -1.44
6 124.25 125.40 11.55 11.00 13.41 0.011 0.55 -2.41 -1.43
1986 7 125.31 126.70 11.62 11.06 13.54 0.014 0.56 -2.48 -1.47
8 128.15 129.50 11.94 11.33 13.89 0.013 0.61 -2.56 -1.49
9 126.94 129.70 12.32 11.55 13.79 0.028 0.77 -2.24 -1.14
10 129.15 130.20 12.57 11.69 14.02 0.010 0.88 -2.33 -1.23
11 130.50 133.40 12.72 11.91 14.16 0.029 0.81 -2.25 -1.14
12 130.44 130.40 12.71 11.88 14.12 -0.000 0.83 -2.24 -1.16
1 127.75 128.00 12.51 11.70 13.82 0.003 0.81 -2.12 -1.08
2 120.50 122.50 12.14 11.27 13.12 0.020 0.87 -1.85 -0.78
3 120.50 122.30 11.86 11.03 13.24 0.018 0.83 -2.21 -1.02
4 120.94 122.40 11.75 11.00 13.51 0.015 0.75 -2.51 -1.09
5 120.50 122.00 11.70 11.00 13.66 0.015 0.70 -2.66 -1.05
6 120.50 122.00 11.73 11.07 13.71 0.015 0.66 -2.64 -0.98
1987 7 121.00 123.20 11.83 11.17 13.85 0.022 0.66 -2.68 -0.93
8 122.88 125.50 11.99 11.27 14.16 0.026 0.72 -2.89 -1.02
9 123.50 126.60 12.23 11.42 14.34 0.031 0.81 -2.92 -0.93
10 119.00 121.90 12.27 11.35 13.87 0.029 0.92 -2.52 -0.55
11 119.00 121.30 12.14 11.34 13.72 0.023 0.80 -2.38 -0.56
12 119.00 120.80 11.92 11.12 13.47 0.018 0.80 -2.35 -0.78
1 118.00 118.40 11.70 10.91 13.09 0.004 0.79 -2.18 -0.89
2 114.25 116.10 11.41 10.60 12.52 0.018 0.81 -1.92 -0.83
3 114.00 115.60 11.23 10.43 12.45 0.016 0.80 -2.02 -0.97
4 114.00 115.10 11.08 10.33 12.54 0.011 0.75 -2.21 -1.07
5 114.00 115.00 11.04 10.34 12.74 0.010 0.70 -2.40 -1.06
6 114.69 116.20 11.05 10.34 13.06 0.015 0.71 -2.72 -1.13
1988 7 117.25 118.30 11.25 10.52 13.52 0.010 0.73 -3.00 -1.21
8 125.06 127.60 11.71 10.98 14.17 0.025 0.73 -3.19 -1.53
9 130.25 134.60 12.26 11.48 14.35 0.043 0.78 -2.87 -1.54
10 131.75 136.40 12.78 11.88 14.24 0.046 0.90 -2.36 -1.29
11 132.00 136.30 13.06 12.23 14.21 0.043 0.83 -1.98 -0.97
12 132.25 136.00 13.14 12.27 14.30 0.037 0.87 -2.03 -0.96
1 125.31 129.10 12.83 11.90 13.67 0.038 0.93 -1.77 -0.63
2 117.75 117.60 12.34 11.26 12.93 -0.002 1.08 -1.67 -0.52
3 118.00 118.00 11.98 10.98 13.00 0.000 1.00 -2.02 -0.82
4 118.75 120.40 11.97 11.09 13.11 0.016 0.88 -2.02 -0.79
5 122.31 123.90 11.94 11.12 13.44 0.016 0.82 -2.32 -1.11
6 128.65 130.80 12.16 11.33 13.86 0.021 0.83 -2.53 -1.54
1989 7 136.88 140.60 12.57 11.76 14.54 0.037 0.81 -2.78 -1.93
8 143.25 143.30 13.18 12.37 15.23 0.000 0.81 -2.86 -1.96
9 148.70 155.80 13.97 13.10 15.95 0.071 0.87 -2.85 -1.77
10 151.25 160.30 14.92 13.87 16.55 0.090 1.05 -2.68 -1.26
11 154.50 163.60 15.62 14.69 17.13 0.091 0.93 -2.44 -0.76
12 154.50 162.20 15.91 14.93 16.91 0.077 0.98 -1.98 -0.52
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NCE Wis Assy Wis Gross WAP WIS-A M-W M-W
40# Point 40# Grade A Cheese Minus Minus Minus Minus
Year Month Blocks Blocks Milk M-W




Cents per Lb. Dollars per Cwt. $/Lb. Dollars per Cwt.
1 144.56 152.30 15.14 13.94 15.49 0.077 1.20 -1.55 -0.52
2 126.31 131.60 13.67 12.22 13.54 0.053 1.45 -1.32 -0.41
3 126.95 130.70 13.31 12.02 13.63 0.037 1.29 -1.61 -0.68
4 137.00 140.50 13.40 12.32 14.67 0.035 1.08 -2.35 -1.38
5 139.56 145.80 13.76 12.78 14.93 0.062 0.98 -2.15 -1.18
6 143.80 149.50 14.16 13.28 15.32 0.057 0.88 -2.04 -1.10
1990 7 145.88 151.00 14.31 13.43 15.41 0.051 0.88 -1.98 -1.16
8 143.85 150.30 14.05 13.09 15.24 0.064 0.96 -2.15 -1.29
9 137.50 142.60 13.46 12.50 14.67 0.051 0.96 -2.17 -1.25
10 114.88 114.90 11.88 10.48 12.46 0.000 1.40 -1.98 -1.01
11 108.75 112.00 11.46 10.25 11.82 0.033 1.21 -1.57 -0.63
12 108.81 112.70 10.92 10.19 11.85 0.039 0.73 -1.66 -0.69
1 108.72 111.40 10.91 10.16 11.85 0.027 0.75 -1.69 -0.71
2 108.75 111.50 10.87 10.04 11.82 0.028 0.83 -1.78 -0.84
3 108.75 111.50 10.77 10.02 11.77 0.028 0.75 -1.75 -0.86
4 108.75 111.80 10.77 10.04 11.78 0.030 0.73 -1.74 -0.84
5 111.90 115.00 10.94 10.23 12.17 0.031 0.71 -1.94 -0.96
6 117.88 121.40 11.25 10.58 12.85 0.035 0.67 -2.27 -1.21
1991 7 124.58 128.40 11.73 10.99 13.44 0.038 0.74 -2.45 -1.47
8 131.03 136.10 12.34 11.50 14.02 0.051 0.84 -2.52 -1.60
9 134.34 139.70 12.90 12.02 14.47 0.054 0.88 -2.45 -1.41
10 135.06 140.20 13.53 12.50 14.99 0.051 1.03 -2.49 -1.01
11 131.31 135.80 13.53 12.48 14.72 0.045 1.05 -2.24 -0.65
12 126.67 130.20 13.42 12.10 14.23 0.035 1.32 -2.13 -0.57
1 122.53 125.40 13.05 11.71 13.60 0.029 1.34 -1.89 -0.54
2 116.99 119.00 12.52 11.21 12.92 0.020 1.31 -1.71 -0.49
3 116.07 119.80 12.28 10.98 12.90 0.037 1.30 -1.92 -0.63
4 131.90 131.90 12.65 11.46 14.57 -0.000 1.19 -3.11 -1.73
5 133.98 139.90 13.17 12.06 14.96 0.059 1.11 -2.90 -1.34
6 135.98 141.30 13.58 12.46 14.87 0.053 1.12 -2.41 -1.14
1992 7 137.06 141.80 13.66 12.59 14.89 0.047 1.07 -2.30 -1.12
8 137.95 142.00 13.70 12.54 15.01 0.041 1.16 -2.47 -1.25
9 134.28 136.90 13.54 12.28 14.68 0.026 1.26 -2.40 -1.15
10 129.89 132.40 13.39 12.05 14.22 0.025 1.34 -2.17 -0.94
11 126.10 129.40 13.12 11.84 13.64 0.033 1.28 -1.80 -0.77
12 120.41 123.20 12.44 11.34 13.01 0.028 1.10 -1.67 -0.70
Mean 126.34 129.37 12.48 11.58 13.83 0.03 0.90 -2.25 -1.05
St. Dev 10.77 12.24 1.11 1.01 1.11 0.02 0.22 0.39 0.34
Minimum -0.00 0.54 -3.19 -1.96
Maximum 0.09 1.45 -1.32 -0.41
Coef. of Var. 0.69 0.25 -0.17 -0.33
Maximum Deviation from Mean: Positive 0.06 0.55 0.93 0.64
Negative -0.03 -0.36 -0.95 -0.90
1 Milk values are adjusted to reflect 3.5 percent butterfat content
2 Gross cheese value is cheese yield for milk of 3.5 percent butterfat and 3.15 percent protein (using Van Slyke
formula) times NCE block price plus .27 pounds butter times Chicago Mercantile Exchange butter price plus 5.82
pounds dry whey times central states dry whey price.
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